Transition in Afghanistan Unravelling US Policy

Salman haidar

Totally unexpected incidents involving US troops have given a severe blow to US plans for an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. The burning and defiling of the Quran at a US base set in train escalating anger among the Afghans and led to a number of violent outbreaks with much loss of life. 

The hostility towards the USA and its presence in Afghanistan generated by this episode can hardly be undone, notwithstanding the earnest efforts undertaken by the US President and the most senior members of his Administration. Currently, a measure of calm has been restored but it cannot be assumed that the indignation has been buried and forgotten, and it will surely remain a bitter memory that could have an effect on future relations between Kabul and Washington. 

And even before the impact of the earlier occurrence had been absorbed, there was another major incident, this time involving a US soldier who ran amok and killed a large number of civilian Afghans in their villages. This was an individual act by an aberrant individual but it has made the US presence in Afghanistan more unpopular than ever. Once more, apologies have poured in from the highest US quarters, while the Afghan leadership has reacted with resentment and anger. Afghan demands that the perpetrator should be tried in Afghanistan under the national processes of that country have not been heeded and the person concerned has been quietly taken away to face trial in his own country. This has compounded the antipathy of the Afghans to the US presence in their midst.

Notwithstanding these severe setbacks, the US leadership has reaffirmed its adherence to the withdrawal plan it had adopted some time ago. Under this, the US military presence is to be gradually and systematically drawn down over the next couple of years, to be totally ended by the close of 2014. It is clarified by US spokespersons that it is not intended to leave a vacuum at the time of withdrawal, to be exploited by elements hostile to Kabul. According to the plan, as US and other foreign forces are reduced, home grown security forces are to be inducted to replace them. It is recognized that training and equipping local personnel to take on the necessary security responsibilities is a huge job and the effort hitherto in that direction has achieved considerably less than was hoped for. The training of local recruits to the army and police force is a major responsibility of the coalition force that is present on the ground to support the Afghan government. For effective training to take place, it is essential that there should be mutual understanding and sympathy between the experts from abroad and the freshly inducted local forces. But the incidents that have been witnessed recently tend to erode the sense of shared purpose and make the task much more problematical. 

Nor can it be ignored that apart from the major eruptions mentioned above there has been a steady series of incidents involving violence between local and foreign armed personnel. At the best of times it would be difficult to impart the sort of training that new recruits require, and with the current difficulties the goal has become that much harder to attain. Thus one principal component of an orderly transition now looks difficult indeed. To be noted, too, is that President Karzai has not been slow to voice his own and the Afghan people’s anger and has sought to place limits on the freedom of action of US and other foreign forces. However, his government is perceived as being critically dependent on support from the USA, so he may not be able to push too hard in this matter. 

Recently, quiet attempts have been made to talk to the Taliban in order to search for an accommodation. This is a tricky and unpredictable business and not much is known about what took place. It was President Karzai who had initially taken the initiative, and he had argued publicly for political contact with some of the more amenable opponents of his regime. Despite initial skepticism, this eventually took place, though it is not known how often the opponents actually met, what they talked about, and how much progress they were able to make. There were one or two false starts, like the one involving someone who came to talk pretending to be a Taliban representative until he was exposed. In the last few days, the small expectations attached to the process have been further reduced with the announcement by the Taliban that they were breaking contact. The reason could be, as some believe, that the Taliban now believe that the tide is now flowing in their favour and they do not need to negotiate at this juncture. More important from their point of view would be to prepare for what happens after the withdrawal so as to be ready for a bid to dominate the entire country.

There may be nothing to such a speculation, and the USA has repeatedly said it has no intention of abandoning the task of rehabilitation in Afghanistan. Yet uncertainty about the future exists and becomes more marked with each destabilizing incident. If the plan for an orderly transition becomes less attainable, thought will have to be given to other possible scenarios, and these are far from comforting. The Taliban can be expected to make their bid, to the apprehension of practically all the neighbours, who have reason to be concerned about the spillover from their domain of the extremism they espouse. Last time they were in the ascendancy, they were strong enough to control most of the country but could not subdue the Northern Alliance with which their war never ended. Fears of a resumption of strife along the same faultlines cannot be dismissed. This could have very damaging consequences within the entire region, as it did last time when Pakistan was drawn in to aid and support the Kabul regime of the Taliban while most of the rest, including India and also Iran, were concerned to limit their baleful influence. 

To avoid such an undesirable outcome, there has been talk of a regional solution for post-withdrawal Afghanistan that would effectively contain within that country its potentially destabilizing influence. At the same time, mention has been of a neutralized Afghanistan, insulated from the rivalries of its surrounding region. Formal arrangements for such a purpose would be complex and may be impossible to procure: for instance, one cannot expect India and Pakistan, each of which is deeply engaged, readily to see eye-to-eye on the issue, and no less difficult would be to bring a sense of common purpose between USA and Iran. Yet this is a most consequential and significant area for regional diplomatic action. India could well take the lead in trying to fashion an initiative for a stable Afghanistan after the USA and its allies withdraw.

The writer is India’s former Foreign Secretary

Source : The Statesman