New York: Despite the pageant and symbolism of lavish state dinners and a nuclear accord with the US in the bag, the relationship between India and the US is drifting because of an inattentive, chalta hai attitude in both Washington and Delhi, writes John Elliott in his new book, Implosion: India’s Tryst With Reality.
There are few more knowledgeable observers of India than Elliott, who has worked as a foreign correspondent in India over three decades. His new book looks at India’s muddled rise to economic stardom on a bumpy, winding road.
Elliott writes incisively about how corruption is a significant stumbling block to growth and he questions the decades of rule by the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. “Implosion” is part reportage, part analysis of the impact of liberalisation and traces the build-up of social unrest over corruption, rape and exploitation of land and reflects on the limitations of India’s tentative foreign policy.
Elliott also examines the relationship between India and the US and the impact of L’Affaire Khobragade on the two nations. The author says the sharp reaction – and media frenzy – in India flushed out “a latent anti-America feeling” born of resentment of the way the US threw its weight. “Before this row broke out, the relationship had been drifting because of a lack of care in both countries with a weakly-led Indian embassy in the US and an American ambassador in Delhi who, though able, could not excite political support back home,” writes Elliott, adding that the drift increased as the Indian government and the country’s economy became weaker. Elliott notes that the India-US strategic dialogue has continued but no top leader in either country is consistently pushing it ahead. The book quotes officials saying there weren’t enough senior diplomats and other experts, especially in India, to run all the areas of co-operation effectively. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama came up with a statement in September last year that comes close to turning the India-US relationship into a de facto alliance motivated in part by China’s growing power in Asia and India being stuck in a hostile neighbourhood.
The strongly worded joint statement issued after Singh met Obama in the White House stated India and the US “share common security interests and place each other at the same level as their closest partners.” “This principle will apply with respect to defense technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defense articles and services, including the most advanced technology,” added the statement, just stopping shy of declaring the countries formal treaty allies.
National security advisor Shivshankar Menon was quick to describe the move as a lasting ‘strategic partnership, not an alliance.’ Elliot writes that how the partnership develops will depend largely on how “America’s initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region play out, especially with China.” Elliot says Obama had India in his sights when he responded to China’s growing regional ambitions by launching a new ‘pivot’ towards Asia in November 2011 (later softened to a ‘rebalancing’ of America’s Asia focus).
In East Asia, Delhi is broadening its strategic engagement with the US-allied countries of the Western Pacific. The changes have been most profound with regard to Japan, which is fast becoming one of India’s closest partners in the region. India has found common ground with regional capitals alarmed by China’s claims in the South China Sea, and Delhi has become a vocal proponent of “Freedom of Navigation” there. “India’s role will depend on its reactions as those events unfold, and whether it has the will – and maybe one day the economic strength – to play a leading role in world affairs. Either way, the new relationship with the US has to be seen as a positive development, provided India maintains its independence as a friend and occasional partner but not an ally,” writes Elliot.
The author points out how thorny and difficult relations are likely to be in the years ahead. Any US policymaker who believes New Delhi will act as a lieutenant for US interests is delusional. “The US has learned – maybe with some surprise – that India is not prepared to become an obedient ally, and that it will not dutifully follow American wishes on foreign policy or on quickly opening up foreign investment regulations to hungry US companies,” writes Elliott. “India has learned that it can say ‘no’ to the US, for example, by not breaking relations with Iran or with Myanmar (before both regimes softened their stance in 2013 and 2012), and by voting against the US (and Israel) on Palestine’s status in the UN,” he adds.
The book also carries an engaging interview with former foreign secretary of India Kanwal Sibal, who says the US had done more than any other country to damage India strategically over the previous 60 years. “It had done this directly by curbing the development of India’s strategic capabilities, by imposing nuclear and space and missile related sanctions, and by applying stringent export controls on transfers of high-technology,” Kanwal tells Elliott. “Now the US is undoing a lot of those negative attitudes and expect us to be pro-them, but we say “you are only undoing things you did against us, so we owe you little”. By contrast, says Sibal, who was ambassador in Moscow after retiring as foreign secretary, ‘Russia has rarely let India down’.
Given the lingering wariness about America, the billions Washington pours into Pakistan, many in the Indian establishment have steadfastly worked to ensure India remains on good terms with trusted old friend Russia as a source for arms, including Sukhoi fighter planes. The US had, however, by mid- 2012 received defence orders approaching $9 billion over the previous ten years, which made defence the most active area of co-operation. Elliott sees India’s new relationship with the US as a positive development, but he says that “contrary to what many think, the countries should properly be described as occasional partners but never allies.”
Courtesy : First Post
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