How Gandhi, Patel and Nehru colluded with Brits to suppress Naval Mutiny of 1946

Saswati Sarkar, Shanmukh and Dikgaj 10 August 2015 Starting February 18, 1946, a group of ratings at the Royal Indian Navy mutinied in Bombay. The mutiny soon spread to all units of the Royal Indian Navy: ships at anchor, shore establishments, ships on the high seas.  The mutiny was brutally suppressed by the British with complicity of icons of India’s freedom struggle: Gandhi, Patel and Nehru.  The import of the mutiny may be judged from an extract of a letter written by P.V. Chuckraborty, former Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, on March 30 1976:  "When I was acting as Governor of West Bengal in 1956, Lord Clement Attlee, who as the British Prime Minister in post war years was responsible for India’s freedom, visited India and stayed in Raj Bhavan Calcutta for two days`85 I put it straight to him like this: ‘The Quit India Movement of Gandhi practically died out long before 1947 and there was nothing in the Indian situation at that time, which made it necessary for the British to leave India in a hurry. Why then did they do so?’ In reply Attlee cited several reasons, the most important of which were the INA activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India, and the RIN Mutiny which made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the British. When asked about the extent to which the British decision to quit India was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s 1942 movement, Attlee’s lips widened in smile of disdain and he uttered, slowly, ‘Minimal’." [28].  In early 1946, there were revolts all over the British Indian armed forces. While the naval revolt was the most widespread, the revolts of the army were considered particularly dangerous, since the army was the vital arm necessary to keep the Indians suppressed.  Specifically mentioning the army revolts at Jabalpur, Gen. VK Singh points out in his book,  "Though the mutiny at Jubbulpore was at that time not considered as ‘serious’ as the naval mutiny, its repercussions were immense. The earlier revolts in the RIAF and RIN, though more widespread and larger in scale, did not really worry the British authorities, because the Indian Army, on which they depended for meeting external and internal threats, was still considered reliable, having proved its fidelity during World War II. The mutiny at Jubbulpore was the first major uprising in the Indian Army during or after the war. This set alarm bells ringing from Delhi to London, and doubts began to be expressed on the steadfastness of the Indian Army. Ultimately, it forced Britain to reach a settlement with the political parties and quit India." pp. 139-140, [32]. This view is corroborated by Mansergh,  "It is pertinent to remember that one of the compelling reasons for the departure of the British from India was the apprehension that the loyalty of Indian armed forces was doubtful. Due to obvious reason, the staunchness of the Army was more worrisome than that of the other two Services. On 5 September 1946, in a note by the commander- in-chief on the military aspects of the plan to withdraw from India, General Auchinleck was to record, “The importance of keeping the Indian Army steady is emphasised. It is the one disciplined force in which communal interests are subordinated to duty, and on it depends the stability of the country. The steadiness of the RIN and the RIAF is of lesser import but any general disaffection in them is likely seriously to affect the reliability of the army." pp. 642, vol 8, [11]. We will describe the role in the naval mutiny of the eminent icons of India’s freedom struggle, relying on their speeches and writings, the memoir of mutineer, BC Dutt [24], and declassified British governmental documents related to the transfer of power [11].  We will also examine, briefly, the air revolt and the army mutiny at Jabalpur.  Lastly, we examine the effect of the naval, army and air mutinies in the British Indian armed forces on the British decision to transfer power to Indians. In concluding this introduction, we present the assessment of Gen. VK Singh, about the effect of the different mutinies on the freedom movement.  About the cumulative effect of the different mutinies, he says, "Had the Indian armed forces remained staunch, there is little doubt that British rule would have continued for at least another 10 to 15 years. The nationalistic feeling that had entered the heart of the Indian soldier was one of the most important factors in the British decision to grant complete independence to India, and also to advance the date from June 1948 to August 1947. " p. xiii, [32]. Please read on : http://www.dailyo.in/politics/how-gandhi-patel-and-nehru-colluded-with-the-british-to-suppress-the-naval-mutiny-of-1946/story/1/5567.html __,_._,___

61 more Narendra Ch