By Col. R. Hariharan
[This article answers questions
raised in a radio interview on August 12, 2015.]
Q: It is about fifteen months since
Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power. During this period foreign
relations appear to have been given great importance. What do you think are the
changes in India’s foreign policy now?
A: I am no expert on foreign
policy; but as a strategic analyst I find that the basic tenets of our foreign
policy enunciated after independence still continue to be the same. Our first
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a visionary; he evolved the foreign policy
to further his holistic vision for India. It emphasized peace and harmonious
relations with all countries and India finding its rightful place in the
post-colonial world in keeping with its size and geostrategic location. He
understood economic and industrial development as the keys to freeing the
country from the shackles of colonial dependency and improving the lives of
ordinary people. The five-year development plans were fashioned to achieve
this.
From Nehru’s time foreign policy
became prime minister-centric and has continued so, though the practice of
appointing separate minister to look after external affairs came in vogue in
1964. Under Nehru’s stewardship, India played a leadership role among the
newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. He chose to develop close
relations with Peoples Republic of China (PRC) which was shunned by the Western
powers. He led the non-aligned movement with emphasis on five principles of
panch sheel to avoid Cold War contretemps. Probably, China’s aggression in 1962
was a moment of truth to Nehru as much as the nation bringing home the world of
real politick in which we exist.
Nehru’s successors were not
visionaries of the same order and they were by and large mission-oriented. As a
result the country grew more inward looking and foreign policy became means to
the ends of political leadership. However, they stuck to the basic principles
of our foreign policy as set by Nehru. The end of Cold War and realignment of
global strategic alignments have led to changes in India’s priorities in
relationship-building, but the basic contours of foreign policy have remained
the same.
Prime Minister Modi is perhaps the
first prime minister in a long time who has spelt out his vision for India,
soon after he assumed office in May 2014. He articulated it in his Independence
Day on August 15, 2014. Since then he has fleshed out his vision at various
national forums. Its main ingredients include: boosting India’s industrial
growth by inviting foreign investment in infrastructure with emphasis on making
things in India to increase job opportunities; to upgrade digital
infrastructure for timely delivery of services to the people by developing
smart cities; improve grass root public services to provide better governance,
education, healthcare and clean environment to help maintain social cohesion
with gender equity, and lastly to enlarge India’s strategic influence in the
Asia-Pacific region in keeping with its growing global economic power.
The prime minister has adopted a
personalized style of relationship building with his counterparts in other
countries, particularly with China, Japan and the U.S; this seems to have paid
handsome dividends. He prioritised India’s neighbouring countries in his foreign
visits to leverage on India’s soft power and influence. Though he has visited
25 countries, his priority seems to be the Asia-Pacific region and as a
corollary China, Japan and the US have been his favoured destination. He
has departed from India’s traditional low profile foreign policy projection by
making foreign interactions well publicized. Modi’s clear and assertive
communication has helped him build bridges with the Indian Diaspora wherever he
visited.
Though Modi’s foreign policy
initiatives may not have yielded all the results he desired, he has gained the
attention of global leaders who have welcomed his development agenda. This is
an important take away after 15 months because given India’s massive and
confusing socio-political compulsions; in any case to fulfil Modi’s ambitious
agenda would take at least a decade.
Q: Though India might have done well
in its external front, there seems to be no progress in our relations with
Pakistan. How do you visualize India-Pakistan relations in the future?
A: You are right; there had been
really no breakthrough in our relations with Pakistan, though Prime Minister
Modi’s invitation to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for his inauguration
and meeting thereafter kindled hopes of improvement in the relationship. But
unfortunately, such hopes have been belied. In fact it has worsened with the
escalation in ceasefire violations, terrorist infiltrations and attacks
triggering of separatist agitations in Jammu and Kashmir, even spilling over to
neighbouring Punjab.
The core problem in relationship
building with Pakistan is its elected government does not enjoy the freedom to
fashion and execute its foreign policy and trade (with India) without the
concurrence of the army. During the last year or so Pakistan army has enlarged
its ability to influence government policy after it became a guarantor to its
survival from terrorist threat by successfully carrying out large scale
operations against the Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan)
terrorists.
So it is doubtful whether we can
expect any change in Pakistan’s attitude to improve its relationship with India
in the near future. The first step for it would involve Pakistan government
taking firm action against all jihadi groups (patronized by the army) operating
against India from Pakistani soil. Pakistan army has a deep seated grudge
against the ignominy it suffered after Indian armed forces threw it out of East
Pakistan, resulting in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Given this
background, the future of India-Pakistan relations looks bleak as long Pakistan
government continues to remain hostage to Pakistan army. The recent boost to
Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China has introduced a new and
unpredictable element in the bipartisan relationship with potential to
indirectly influence it.
Q: How about India’s relations with
China? Can we expect any major improvement in India-China relations in the near
future?
A: We must be realistic in our
expectations regarding China. Resolving the hardy perennials bugging
India-China relations – China’s illegal occupation of Indian territory, large
Chinese claims on Indian territory in the Northeast and finalizing a mutually
acceptable demarcation of India-China boundary (as China has refused to accept
Mc Mahon Line as the boundary) may take a long time. Though the two sides have
nominated special representatives to discuss the issues, China does not seem to
have an urge to bring them to a closure in the near future. Though modalities
to avoid accidental intrusions and conflict have been worked out between the
two countries, there had been no real progress on these issues. So avoidance of
conflict, rather than resolving disputes once for all seems to be the agreed
flavour of the parleys between the two countries.
However, fortunately China’s
President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi are focusing on realising their
dreams of benefiting their people through peaceful and harmonious relationship.
Realising that there was no point in waiting for the resolution of their long standing
disputes, both leaders have focused on building a strong economic, trade and
commercial relationship by pooling their resources and geographical advantages
for mutual benefit. China has reciprocated Modi’s invitation to invest in
infrastructure and manufacturing industries in India. India has shown its
readiness to join the BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) corridor project
linking India and China, though India has not made up its mind on joining
China’s ambitious ‘Belt and Road’ initiative in linking China to Central and
South Asia as well as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to access Indian
Ocean.
At the strategic level, there are
both positive and negative developments. India has joined two international
economic initiatives close to China’s heart – the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Bank launched by the
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping. India has also joined
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), started by China originally as an
instrument of regional anti-terrorism cooperation, now evolving its own
regional strategic dynamics. At the same time, India cannot afford to ignore
China’s mega entry in Af-Pak region practically elbowing out India from the
scene. Coupled with the whittling down of American presence and China’s massive
aid of $46 billion aid to Pakistan (much more than the Marshall’s Plan outlay
for post-war Europe), we can expect China to play increasingly an assertive
role to further its strategic interests on our Western borders. This could
emerge as a major, as yet unfathomed, factor in India-China relations in the
coming years.
Q: With the rapid spread of Islamic
State (ISIS)-spearheaded jihadi terrorism the world over, why India is not
joining the global war on terror? Don’t you think it would be in India’s
interest to do so?
Firstly, I would not use the Western
coinage “global war on terror” to describe the operations of the U.S. and its
Western and Gulf allies are carrying out in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere. There
are a number of factors preventing India from joining the war against ISIS. The
role of those carrying out the operations is suspect as their strategic
objective is change of regimes in the Arab world which do not toe their line;
as a result an arc of instability from Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has
been created rendering at least a million refugees. The resulting instability
has been exploited by ISIS, which is a clone of Al Qaeda.
This war has been made more complex
by its Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict of interest involving Saudi Arabia on side
and Iran on the other. India has a huge Shia population, next only to Iran, and
India’s role has to take this aspect into reckoning. There is an economic
aspect also relevant to India. The conflict has affected Indian expatriates
working in these countries and further escalation of the war or spread of
destabilization would only increase the plight of nearly two million strong
Indian-workforce in this region.
There is no strategic context for
India’s participation in this war, particularly when India has to safeguard its
national security from Pakistan-based partners of Al Qaeda terrorists. In any
case, India will have to deal with ISIS threat which could loom large at our
own gates as when ISIS takes over the client groups of Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Moreover, militarily speaking, India does not have enough troops to spare for
such a resource consuming counter-terrorism operation. Indian involvement could
also worsen the operational capability of our armed forces at home,
particularly when they are already reeling from shortage of weapons and
armaments. Our first priority to should be to protect our own national
interest; only then we should consider other requirements.
(Col
R Hariharan, a retired MI specialist on South Asia, is associated with the
Chennai Centre for China Studies and the South Asia Analysis Group. E-mail: haridirect@gmail.com Blog: http://col.hariharan.info)
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