China’s India-Containment Policy stood fully manifested at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Meeting in Seoul on June23-24 2016 in opposing India’s admittance to the
NSG. Strikingly evident was that China ignored vehement Major Powers
support for India.
China’s scuttling India’s bid for NSG inclusion was a foregone
conclusion but India and PM Modi orchestrated a high-voltage global
diplomatic offensive to garner international support for India’s bid and
which evidently came forth in that 40 out of 48 members strongly
supported India’s bid and even forced a special session on India’s
admittance late at night on June 23 2016.
Before discussing the long-term fall-out of China’s India Containment
bid at Seoul one would at first instance dismiss criticism within India
that India’s NSG campaign and PM Modi’s personal meeting with Chinese
President at Tashkent on side-lines of SCO Summit demeaned India and
that India could have done without it as India already with a ‘waiver;
in 2008 was no longer constrained in nuclear commerce. Such criticism
misses the point in analysing the underlying motives of PM Modi’s
diplomatic offensive.
The high-voltage Indian diplomatic offensive on its NSG bid served
two significant strategic objectives. Firstly, India was able to
demonstrate to China the wide global support that existed for India’s
admittance into NSG as an Emerged Power and its track-record of
impeccable credentials for complying with all nuclear norms since 2008.
This would not have been visible if India under the foregone conclusion
that China will not budge in its opposition, had not conducted this
diplomatic offensive.
Significant and more strategically crucial was that such a
high-voltage diplomatic offensive by India including PM Modi himself,
brought into full global limelight that China’s so-called “principled
opposition” to India’s inclusion into NSG was but a fig-leaf to hide
China’s India-Containment Strategy by means other than military. China
was not apologetic that Pakistan’s sensitivities would be hurt if China
let pass India’s admittance. The Chinese decision was not one of
principled opposition but more of political expediency in relation to
Pakistan.
Addedly, China’s India- Containment Strategy manifested at Seoul NSG
Meeting would not only be a valuable input for PM Modi himself in terms
of China-policy formulations but also open the eyes of Inia’s starry
–eyed ‘China-Apologists’ right across the intellectual spectrum
comprising political, diplomatic and academia, who incessantly groan
under the illusion that China is well-meaning towards India and
relations need to be normalised.
More notably, it should be abundantly clear at all levels in India
that the China-Pakistan Axis is a live and multiple threat to India’s
security as thrusted in my recent book on ‘China-India Military
Confrontation:21st Century Perspectives’.
China by opposing India’s admittance in NSG has bitten more than it
can chew in favour of Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Axis currently in
play and India should capitalise on the fact that China in mid-June 2016
is more strategically cornered than three years back. Regular readers
of my SAAG Papers would recall my paper No. 5525 dated 9 July 2013
entitled “China Strategically Cornered Globally: India’s Window of
Opportunity”. Opportunities for India in mid02016 in this direction
have multiplied much more.
India in mid-2016 needs to drastically re-set and revise its basic
premises of India’s China-policy to attune it to the open manifestation
of China’s India-Containment Policy. India’s responses should now be
robust and firm and strongly anchored to the strategic reality that
“China is India’s Eternal Enemy” as ‘eternal’ as the edifice so-named in
Beijing.
India’s management of ‘China Eternal Enemy Threat’ needs to be viewed
at two different levels, namely, India’s non-military responses and
India’s military responses.
India’s non-military responses against China need to incorporate
political, diplomatic and economic measures to convey the message to
China that it takes two to tango in the Asian strategic space and that
Asia is not one-way Chinese Street.
Politically, India should put into cold-storage for some time all
high-level political exchanges and two-way visits. India politically
enjoys today more political capital in Asian capitals than China does
and it shows vividly. India’s high-level political visits o Asian
nations on China’s periphery must be intensified.
Politically, India should also exit all China-led or China-dominated
organisations like BRICS, SCO and the Russia-China-India Trilateral
annual meetings. All there three organisations, as constantly advocated
by me for years are ‘strategically redundant’ and only serve Chinese
policy objectives.
Diplomatically, India should oppose or filibuster on all Chinese
initiatives at global forums or initiatives from which China could
derive benefit. As a starter India should not ratify the forthcoming
Paris Climate Agreement. The United States would understand. Within the
Indian Sub-Continent India should wind up SAARC and establish an
alternative mechanism excluding Pakistan. India’s diplomatic focus in
its in terms of neighbourhood footprints must be enlarged. No more
dialogues with Pakistan at any cost. Diplomatically, Indian foreign
policy must hyphenate the China-Pakistan relationship in its
perspectives.
Economically, India today is in a position to hit China hard when
Chinese economic growth has become stagnant. India should downgrade its
trade relations with China with figures of over $100 billion and let
China find alternative markets, if it can. India should stop all Chinese
FDI in India.
China’s India-Containment Policy would be most strongly be felt in
the military field where both China and Pakistan would come into play in
coming times and especially if India resorts to measures advocated
above. This would manifest itself in terms of increased Chinese military
incursions into Indian Territory, border provocations and clashes.
Pakistan in tandem would increase border clashes along the LAC,
increased proxy war in Kashmir Valley and within the Indian Hartland.
India has in the past for the last two decades has effectively
countered all such threats.. All that India needs to do is heightened
vigilance and heightened ‘situation awareness’ by Indian intelligence
agencies to tailor their intelligence and counter-intelligence templates
against both China and Pakistan.
More importantly, India can only counter China’s India Containment
Policy effectively, which incorporates the China-Pakistan Dual Military
Threat, by fast track Indian ‘war-preparedness’ plans with upto date
military inventories. The Indian Air Force must be provided its 136
fighter planes shortage even by ‘off the shelf’ purchases, whatever the
cost.
The above analysis is not an attempt at ‘war-mongering’ as Indian
intellectual glitterati would be prompted to dismiss at first instance.
It is a timely warning and reminder for India that China can never be
trusted and that India should not lapse once again in terms of the
Nehruvian pre-1962 misreading of Chinese intentions and India’s
consequent lack of war-preparedness.
Strategically, India should not join any of the Chinese One Belt One
Road plans but also launch a psychological campaign to highlight and
sensitise other Asian countries of falling into China’s trap gilded with
economic halos. India’s diplomatic thrusts in countering China’s India
Containment Policy deserves a separate Paper which shall soon be
forthcoming.
Let us not forget that China’s India-Containment Policy in mid-June
2016 has now the added Chinese fears of the strengthening of United
States-India and Japan-India strategic partnerships. It is not for India
to allay Chinese fears but for China to modulate and moderate its
India-Containment Policy and be accommodative of India’s strategic
sensitivities.
Lastly, in conclusion, it needs to be reiterated that India’s
political leadership and policy establishment should no longer be
fixated on ‘what would China think’ on India’s strategic moves, but what
steps need to be taken to neutralise China’s India Containment Policy
which in 2016 is ‘Live and in Operation’ to limit India’s rise as a
powerful nation.
By Dr Subhash Kapila
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
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