Pakistan’s Switch from ‘United States Frontline State’ to ‘China’s Front Line State’

In 2015, Pakistan perceives Army which controls Pakistan’s foreign policy formulations towards the United States, China, India and Afghanistan has the ill-repute of being a ‘rental state’ willing to be rented by whichever nation is ready to pay the price of Pakistan’ Army’s strategic complicity for their gains.

In 2015, it appears that China followed by Russia have outbid the United States and Saudi Arabia in hiring the services of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan for their own strategic ends. China was all along keen to snatch Pakistan from its military linkages with the United States and emerge as an unambiguous military By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Pakistan has made a notable strategic switch from ‘United States Frontline State’ to ‘China’s Frontline State’ in 2015 and this carries serious implications for United States embedment in the Indian Subcontinent and for India’s national security in the context of the China-Pakistan Dual Military Threat to India.

Pakistan and the Pakistan asset for China in the Indian Subcontinent and Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

that a strategic vacuum is going to ensue in Afghanistan following United States military disengagement from Afghanistan. Pakistan Army and China in the preceding months have been manoeuvring to the filling-in of this strategic vacuum by China. Curiously, the United States too, seems ready to accept such a situation where China steps-in in Afghanistan as the lead stakeholder oblivious to the regional implications of such a dubious American acceptability. Pakistan, like China, was also becoming wary of United States moving closer to India.

Pakistan also notably cut itself loose from Saudi Arabian strategic linkages and purse strings when Pakistan Army refused to commit Pakistan Army military formations in Yemen in support of the Saudi Arabian military intervention in Yemen. It was noted then by noted analysts that Pakistan could afford to refuse Saudi Arabia’s requests reinforced by China’s assurances and support. In fact Pakistan loosening itself from Saudi Arabia reinforces the conviction that Pakistan has severed its dependency on the United States.

Pakistan’s switch from ‘United States Frontline State’ to emerge now as ‘China’s Frontline State’ more committedly and openly, carries serious implications for United States strategy of embedment in the Indian Subcontinent, notwithstanding the evolving deepening of US-India strategic and defence ties. The United States perceived that Pakistan as even a dubious ally could be purchased to provide America with a springboard on Iran’s Eastern flank for any possible US military option. That US option would no longer be available. Though at one time both US and China had a congruence of strategic interests in balancing India through Pakistan, the present US strategy may have been to keep Pakistan out of a closer strategic embrace by China to the detriment of US interests. That also now stands negated.

Pakistan’s emergence as a ‘China’s Frontline State’ and its gridlock strategic embrace by China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor enhances the China-Pakistan Dual Military Threat to India. Through this Economic Corridor with a benign economic appellation is actually a military handle by which India’s national security will be strictly threatened. It permits stationing of Chinese military presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir both as an existential threat to India and also as a deterrent against any possible Indian military intervention in that region. The Corridor will also permit China to provide military supplies and logistics in an India-Pakistan armed conflict and in case of an India-China military conflict enable China to open a third outflanking military front against India with Pakistan’s collusion as part of the China-India Dual Military Threat strategy. Indian military planners would surely be tackling strategies to counter such a threat; the fact however remains that India would be forced into raising additional military formations to deal with such a Dual Threat.

Having addressed the implications, the question that now remains to be addressed in the concluding remarks is that whether by switching its ‘Frontline State’ roles from United States to China, has Pakistan irretrievably gone overboard strategically to China?  Pakistan can be expected to follow a minimal hedging strategy towards the United States but when it comes to India, it can be expected that Pakistan would exploit each inch of strategic space extended by the Chinese embrace to effectively enhance the China-Pakistan Dual Military Threat to India.

(Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)