Russia’s promiscuous relationship with Pakistan while at the same
time professing enduring commitment to its long-standing ‘Special
Strategic Partnership’ with India should no longer fool India.
Contextually, Russian troops landing in Pakistan for joint exercises
with Pakistan Army is an unfriendly act against India.
With India-Pakistan relations at an all-time high inflexion point due
to the provocative attacks by Pakistan Army affiliated Jihadi terrorist
groups on the Indian Army Base Camp at Uri and with Indian public
opinion incensed to a point demanding strong reprisals against Pakistan
Army, in the interests of its ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ the least
that Russia could have done was to postpone the joint exercises till
things cooled down, even if it did not want to cancel this exercise with
the Pakistan Army.
That Russia decided to go ahead with this joint exercise with the
Pakistan Army displays an utter Russian disregard for Indian political
sensitivities. Ironically, the joint Russian-Pakistan military exercise
is focused on ‘counter-terrorism operations’ with a country that is
involved in de cades long proxy terrorist war against India. Pakistan
is also widely recognised as the incubator of global terrorism. It is
doubly ironical that this joint Russian-Pakistan military exercise is
being held on Pakistani soil, the defiled soil from which Pakistan Army
affiliated Jihadi terrorists groups have inflicted wanton death and
destruction on hundreds of Indian lives and property.
Still more ironical and adding insult to injury is the reality that
initial reports after the Uri attacks indicated that Russia had called
off the Russia-Pakistan joint military exercise in Pakistan, seemingly
out of respect for Indian political sensitivities. That Russia did a
U-TURN on its earlier declared intentions logically indicates that
Russia has succumbed to Chinese pressures as China is Pakistan’s much
vaunted strategic patron. Chinese pressure would have been intense on
Russia so as to bail out Pakistan from a virtual global isolation.
So where does the above changing trends in Russia’s foreign policy of
a strategic and political pivot to the China-Pakistan Axis leave India
and the future course of Russia-India ‘Special Strategic Partnership?
Especially so, when Indian public opinion does not take kindly to
countries which align with Pakistan. In Indian public opinion
perceptions simple linear equations exist and that is ‘Either you are
with India or you are against India when you cavort with India’s
implacable enemies.’
That the Russian strategic and political pivot to the China-Pakistan
Axis is a strategic pivot to India’s two implacable enemies, namely
China and Pakistan, ‘doubly reinforces’ Indian public perceptions that
Russia has indulged in a well-calibrated unfriendly act against India
and the Indian people.
When equated in terms of human relations, Russia’s promiscuity in
getting attracted to Pakistan, for whatever reasons, amounts to Russia
being an unfaithful partner in the Russia-India Special Partnership. And
therefore, India needs to go in for a divorce from this Special
Strategic Partnership which now exists only in name.
Recently, one Indian defence journal devoted a Special Issue
advocating as to the imperatives of sustaining the Russia-India Special
Strategic Partnership with a lot of extolling by former Indian
Ambassadors and Former Indian Armed Forces Senior Officers recalling all
that Russia had done for India in the past.
Rebutting this advocacy of Indian Russia-well-wishers I have two
simple questions to pose (1) What has Russia done for India lately and
whether the Russian pivot to the China-Pakistan Axis is an
India-friendly act? (2) Is Russia committed to assist India in attaining
the status and role of a Major Global Power?
In strategic and political dimensions Russia has not done anything
substantial for India which could be quoted in favour of Russia that it
still attaches value to its Special Strategic Relationship with India.
Russian strategic and political moves and actions in the recent past
have all been China-centric and promotive of China’s strategic
interests. Most of such moves have been at cross-purposes with Indian
national security interest.
Russia’s strategic pivot to the China-Pakistan Axis is decidedly
unfriendly to Indian security interests. In strategic terms it amounts
to Russia tilting towards India’s confirmed enemies, singly and jointly,
aiming at the ‘containment of India’. In global perceptions it is
likely to be viewed as the first sign of the emergence of a
China-Pakistan-Russia Axis.
Moving to the next and most crucial question for India at his
critical juncture in its ascendant trajectory is whether Russia is
committed to facilitating the emergence of India as a Major Global
Power, two big negatives hover on the horizon. In the immediate
perspective, had it been so, the Russia would not have made a strategic
and political pivot to Pakistan. This itself also negates any long-term
perspectives. Further, the tenor of the Russia-China strategic nexus
strongly indicates that Russia is highly unlikely to tilt towards India
and build it to major global power status as China world not stand for
it, and Russia cannot afford to jettison China.
How intensely Russia is subservient to China stands reflected in one
of my SAAG Paper written after the presentation of my Paper on South
China Sea disputes in Moscow organised by the Russian Academy of Social
Sciences, the noted Russian strategic academics who presented Papers at
this Seminar were all highly tilted towards China’s stand on its
sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea maritime expanse. It
was a glaring betrayal of Russia’s yet another strategic partnership,
this time with Vietnam. When I questioned the Russian hosts why the
change, one was met with a sardonic smile. This only reinforces my
contentions in the preceding paragraph.
Before I am accused of being cynically inclined against Russia and
Russian foreign policies, the regular readers of my SAAG Papers of the
first half of the last decade would recall how strongly I advocated
Russia’ strategic resurgence to balance China’s military rise and for
global strategic equilibrium.
It also needs to be pointed out that Russia is doing no favours to
India presently whether in the field of construction of nuclear reactors
or in the field of military hardware. Russia-India engagement in these
two fields is ‘purely economic in content’ with no strategic
underpinnings. One could sardonically dismiss these moves as retaining
some components of a hedging strategy.
The last major question that needs to be addressed is as to whether
India needs to be politically and strategically perturbed by Russia’s
strategic and political pivot to Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Axis?
The answer is that India should not be perturbed at all. The prevailing
balance of power in Indo Pacific Asia and at the global level is heavily
weighted against the Russia-China Strategic nexus and Russia’s moves
towards Pakistan in South Asia amount to no consequence.
At best, Russia’s moves towards Pakistan amount to poor strategic and
political signalling to India to impede or slow its growing strategic
proximity to the United States and the West. Russia may like to learn
from the United States on the strategic and political costs of
molly-coddling a dysfunctional and terrorist state like Pakistan.
In terms of concluding observations, one would like to emphasise that
while one has argued that Russia’s tilt towards Pakistan is
inconsequential, strategic and political prudence would demand that the
Indian policy establishment keeps Russia’s moves in Pakistan under close
scrutiny. India must also make serious attempts to sensitise the
Russian policy establishment on Indian public perceptions on the gross
insensitivity that Russia has displayed in not cancelling the joint
military exercise with Pakistan against the backdrop of heightened
India-Pakistan tensions in the wake of the Uri attacks. Thereafter, it
is Russia’s call on what trajectory it wishes to adopt in relation to
relations with India.
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis
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